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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7674 
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, is appellant's.) 
Plaintiff sued, as beneficiary, to recover on a certi-
ficate of insurance issued on the life of Dr. Grant 
Gregerson by the Mountain States Insurance Company, a 
mutual benefit association, which policy was assumed by 
the defendant on September 1, 1949 (R. 9, 45). 
Defendant denied liability on the ground that plain-
tiff failed to submit to a physical examination and 
furnish proper proof of insurability to reinstate the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
policy, after its lapse due to the failure to pay the pre-
miums within the grace period (R. 3, 4 and Exhibits 1, 2, 
3 and 4). A further ground for refusal to admit liability 
was that certain statements made by the insured in his 
application for the policy sued upon, constituted war-
ranties, and being false, rendered the policy void (Ex-
hibit "A", R. 4, 5). 
The Mountain States Insurance Company, pursuant 
to application for membership made by Dr. Gregerson, 
a dentist, issued the policy sued upon on June 1, 1947 (R. 
12). Prior thereto, the insured had been insured under 
another policy issued by the Mountain States Insurance 
Company, which was in force for a period of some years 
(R. 12). 
It was stipulated between counsel for the parties 
that Gregerson paid the premiums on the policy sued 
upon to January 1, 1950, that a premium was due on 
January 1, 1950, but that no premium was received by 
defendant on said date or within the grace period of 
thirty days thereafter (R. 9). On February 2, 1950, a 
payment of the monthly premium due January 1, 1950, 
was tendered to defendant to reinstate the policy, but the 
same was refused and held in suspense pending receipt 
of the application for reinstatement and evidence of 
insurability (R. 9, 23, 24, 25 and Exhibit 3). 
On February 9, 1950, the defendants advised in-
sured that it could not reinstate the lapsed policy unless 
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the insured co1npleted and returned the application for 
reinstatement and state1nent of health to its office (Ex-
hibit 1). 
Thereafter, the plaintiff, ~Irs. Gregerson, returned 
the uncon1pleted application for reinstatement to defend-
ant's office, advising defendant's clerk that Dr. Greger-
son, the insured, \Yas ill and could not sign the statement 
of health (R. 19, 20, -±5). Plaintiff then obtained a. letter 
from Dr. L. H. 0. Stobbe, insured's physician, and pre-
sented it to defendant's office (Exhibit 2, R. 21). Dr. 
Stobbe's report in effect stated that insured had been 
completely incapacitated from hypertension for a whole 
year (Exhibit 2). 
On the basis of Dr. Stobbe's report it was determined 
by defendant that insured would have to furnish satis-
factory evidence of insurability before the policy could 
be reinstated, and upon his failure so to do, the tendered 
prennums were returned and refunded (Exhibits 3, 4, 
R. 24-28). 
·No further tender of premium payments was made 
unt~ May 3, 1950, almost a month after the death of 
insured, when a tender of $47.07, covering monthly pre-
miums due February 1, 1950, March 1, 1950, and April 1, 
1950, was received in defendant's office (R. 10, 31, 32). 
The insured died on April 8, 1950 (R. 10), at which 
time the policy sued upon had lapsed, and the same can-
celled when no application for reinstatement or evidence 
of insurability was forthcoming (Exhibits 1, 3, 4, R. 10). 
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The policy contained the usual provisions for pay-
ment of premiums, and that if said premiums were not 
paid within the grace period allowed, that evidence of 
insurability satisfactory to the insurer must be furnished 
(Exhibit "A", page 2). The policy further provided that 
the application became part of the contract itself; that 
all statements by insured in the application are to be 
considered warranties and not representations, and that 
if any of such warranties are proven untrue that the 
policy would be void and the insurer relieved of all 
liability thereunder (Exhibit "A", pages 2_ and 3). These 
provisions, as well as other pertinent clauses of the 
policy, will be more fully set out in appellant's argument. 
A written application was made on May 23, 1947, to 
the Mountain States Insurance Company, a mutual bene-
fit association, by insured, Grant Gregerson, which 
application contained certain statements of warranty 
relative to the state of health of the applicant (Exhibit 
"A"). The Court, in its finding No.6, (R. 46) found that 
this application set out in the defendant's answer was a 
part of Exhibit "A", and that the insured had been 
hospitalized at the L. D. S. Hospital from April 27 to 
May 11, 1946, with medical reports thereon as detailed 
in defendant's Exhibits 6 and 7 (R. 46). 
The appl~cation (Exhibit "A") contained the follow-
ing statements and provisions, among others, which 
applicant answered as follows: 
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"9. (a) HaYe you ever had any of the following 
diseases~ Ansvver each. Tuberculosis or 
any respiratory disease No. Any disease 
of the brain or nervous system ______ . Any 
heart or circulatory disease No. Diabetes 
No. Kidney Disease No. If so, give de-
tails ________________________________________________________________ . 
(b) Have you had any local or constitutional 
disease within the past 5 years~ No. 
(c) Has any medical examiner or physician, 
formally or informally expressed un-
favorable opinion as to your insurability 
or health~ No. 
(d) Have you ever had, or been advised to 
have any surgical operation~ No. 
(e) Have you ever been under observation, 
care or treatment in any hospital, sani-
tarium, asylum or similar institution~ No. 
(f) Are you now in good health~ Yes. 
"10. Name below all causes for which you have 
consulted a physician in the last ten years. 
Severity Any Attending No. of Physi-
Illness Attacks Date & Remaining cian's 
Duration Effects Name and Address 
None 
* * * 
"12. I hereby apply to the Mountain States In-
surance Company for Membership and a Policy 
of Insurance and do hereby, represent and war-
rant that all the statements, representations and 
answers in this application are full, complete and 
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true, whether written in my own hand or not; and 
that this application shall be the basis and become 
part of the Contract between myself and the Com-
pany; and that any concealments, misrepresenta-
tions or untrue statements herein or if I am not 
alive and in good health at the time of the accept-
ance and delivery of the policy based hereon, or 
at the time of any reinstatement after a lapse 
thereof, hereby forfeit any benefits under any 
Policy that may be issued and hereby authorize 
the Secretary or President to cancel this Policy. 
* * * 
"Dated at Salt Lake This 23 day of May, 1947. 
-------------------------------------------- ( s) Dr. Grant Gregerson 
General Agent Signature of Applicant 
(s) Henry J. Black 
Soliciting Agent If Applicant be a minor, 
written guarantee of par-
ents or guardian must be 
secured." 
A summary of the hospital record prepared by Dr. 
Stobbe, (Exhibit 6), while insured was hospitalized at 
the L. D. S. Hospital from April 27, 1946, to May 11, 
1946, shows a final diagnosis of cardiac failure, probably 
coronary; hypertension, cardiac asthma, and treatment 
consisting of digitalis (R. 39, 40). Exhibit 7 is a hospital 
record covering about fifteen days' treatment of insured 
in the V. A. Hospital at Salt Lake City, starting on 
October 13, 1947. Dr. R. M. Dalrymple, M. D., made a 
final diagnosis at that time of disease of the heart, in-
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eluding hypertensiYe rardio-Ya8enlnr disease; left ventri-
cle hypertrophy; and acute left ventricular failure with 
delayed conduction (Exhibit 7). 
The action "\vas tried before the Court, without a 
jur~~, on February S, 1931, and on February 15th, judg-
ment "\Yas entered in favor of plaintiff and against de-
fendant for the sun1 of $3,000.00, the face an1ount of the 
certificate sued upon, and interest from June 13, 1950, 
at the rate of eight per cent per annum (R. 47). Defend-
ant appeals from this judgment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point No. 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, SAID JUDGMENT BEING 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
Point No. 2. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT NO. 4, AND FINDING OF FACT 
NO. 5, TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT ILLEGALLY 
DEMANDED A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OR EVIDENCE 
OF INSURABILITY AS A PREREQUISITE TO REINSTATE-
MENT OF THE POLICY AFTER LAPSE DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF PREMUMS WITHIN GRAGE PERIOD, AND 
THAT SAID REQUIREMENTS WERE WAIVED, SAID FIND-
INGS BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Point No. 3. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT NO. 6, TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THE PHYSICAL CONDITION AND PRIOR HOSPITALIZA-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
TION OF INSURED WAS NOT MATERIAL AT THE TIME 
OF ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY SUED UPON, SAID FIND-
ING BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Point No.4. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING FINDING OF FACT NO. 6, WHEREIN IT FOUND 
THAT THE POLICY BECAME INCONTESTABLE BY ITS 
TERMS AFTER TWO YEARS, SAID FINDING BEING CON-
TRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
Point No.1 
Appellant's Point No. 1 is that the trial court erred 
in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff, and that the 
judgment is contrary to the law and evidence. 
While certain of the questions to be resolved turn 
largely on the interpretation of the insurance certificate 
and the application, it is difficult to conceive how the 
judgment of the trial court can be sustained. The policy 
was issued by a mutual benefit association, in considera-
tion of the payment of a membership fee, the signed 
application, which was attached thereto and made a part 
thereof, and the payment of premiums (Exhibit "A"). 
The policy further provides that "this policy and the 
application therefor shall constitute the entire contract 
between the parties hereto." 
It is appellant's first contention that the policy never 
came into effect because of the breach of warranties by 
assured upon which the validity of the contract itself 
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depended. The policy provides that as a condition pre-
cedent to the policy ron1ing into existence that assured 
must be in good and vigorous health, and that all answers 
in the application are to be construed as warranties and 
not misrepresentations, and further, any such warranties 
if proven untrue, shall void the policy and relieve the 
company from all liability thereunder (Exhibit "A"). 
That insured's ailments and seriously impaired 
health enhanced the risk of death, and were material 
to the risk at the time of application, is not disputed. The 
uncontradicted evidence is that at the time of the appli-
cation, and prior thereto, Dr. Gregerson was suffering 
from cardiac failure, other serious heart conditions and 
hypertension, as well as other less serious physical im-
pairments, and had, in fact, been hospitalized for treat-
ment of the same from April 26 to May 11, 1946 (R. 39, 
40, 46, Exhibits 6, 7). 
Apparently the trial court applied the prov1s1ons 
of Insurance Code requiring a stipulation in all policies 
issued by Life Insurance Companies to the effect that 
all statements made by insured shall, in the absence 
of fraud, be deemed representations, and not warranties, 
in construing the policy herein. Subsection 4, of 43-22-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 63, 
Laws of Utah, 1947, provides as follows: 
" ( 4) A provision that the policy shall con-
stitute the entire contract between the parties, and 
that all statements made by the insured shall, in 
the absence of fraud, be deemed representations 
and not warranties, and that no such statement 
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or statements shall be used in defense of a claim 
under the policy, unless contained in a written 
application therefor and a copy of such applica-
tion shall be indorsed upon or attached to the 
policy when issued." 
The policy sued upon was issued by a mutual benefit 
association, namely the Mountain States Insurance Com-
pany, which operated on the assessment plan. The fol-
lowing provision appears in the policy with reference 
to assessments, at page two, Exhibit "A": 
"In addition to the regular premiums desig-
nated on the first page hereof, such additional 
premiums or assessments to the extent needed to 
pay a proportionate share of claims and expenses 
necessary to maintain the tabular reserves re-
quired under this Policy and the laws of this 
State, shall be paid as required by Section 31, 
Chapter 44, Laws of Utah, and any amendments 
hereafter made." 
Section 43-22-1 of the Insurance Code, supra, speci-
fically excepts the application of its provisions to com-
panies operating on the assessment plan. At the end 
of the statute itself appears the following: 
"Exceptions: The foregoing provisions shall 
not apply to annuities, industrial policies, or to 
group life insurance, or to companies operating 
on the assessment plan." 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in applying 
the theory of representations rather than warranties. The 
evidence, however, is abundantly clear that even on the 
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theory of fr~udulent 1nisrepresentations the insurance 
contract should haYe been declared void. In the case of 
Gillan 'V. Equitable Life ~:1ssurance Society, (Nebr.), 10 
N\v ... (~d) 693, 1-1-S .A.LR 496, a statute 1nuch the same 
as 43-:2:2-1 ( 4), lT tah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, 
supra, "~as under consideration. The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska held the policy void, under a similar fact situ-
ation to the case at hand, using the following language, 
as appears at page 503 of 'T olmne 148 of A.L.R.: 
"Within the meaning of these definitions the 
conclusion is inescapable that the answers given 
by plaintiff were fraudulent. It is well known that 
the issuance of policies with or without disability 
benefits is dependent upon the health of the appli-
cant, and a wilful and intentional failure of an 
applicant to disclose in response to direct and 
clear inquiry that which the company had the 
right to know for the purpose of determining the 
true state of health of the applicant, and whether 
or not it would accept the risk, cannot be con-
sidered other than fraudulent." 
Insured was a dentist, whose formal education in-
cluded a considerable amount of medical training. There 
can be no doubt but that insured, at the time of the appli-
cation, well kne'v and understood the gravity of his ail-
ments. 
It is submitted that by the clear and convincing evi-
dence of fraud on the part of the applicant, Dr. Greger-
son, the insurance policy should be declared void. 
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While there was a conflict of evidence as to in-
sured's condition of health in the case of Braddock, by 
Smith, v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn., 89 Utah 75, 54 
P. (2d) 1189, that case is very similar to, and decisive 
of this case insofar as the warranties of insured are con-
cerned. There, the applicant for a certificate in a frater-
nal benefit association, answered questions much the 
same in substance as those contained in insured's appli-
cation (Exhibit "A"). The trial court submitted the case 
to a jury on the theory that the statements made by in-
sured were representations rather than warranties. This 
court remanded the case for a retrial to allow the parties 
to present their evidence under the correct theory of 
warranty rather than misrepresentation. This court 
indicated that if there had been no conflict of evidence 
as to whether applicant was in fact in good health at the 
time, it would have directed a dismissal of the cause in 
the lower court. In the present case, the evidence is clear 
and uncontradicted that the applicant, at the time of 
answering the warranties contained in the application 
on May 23, 1947, was afflicted with serious illness and 
diseases (R. 39, 40, 46, Exhibit 6), which were of such a 
nature as to weaken and impair the constitution, shorten 
life, and directly affect the insurance risk. 
In the Braddock v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn. case, 
supra, this court, at page 81 of Volume 89 of the Utah 
Reports follows the general rule that a breach of war-
ranty, such as is present here, renders the policy void. 
The Court stated : 
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" .. :\ .. different and Inore strict rule of law ap-
plies to breach of '"·arran ty than to false repre-
sentations. ·A U'arra nty in the la1r of insurance 
consists of a stateJnent by insnred ~tpon the literal 
truth of zchich the validity of the contract de-
pends.' 3:2 C. J. 1:273. The distinctions between 
warranties and representations are stated as fol-
lo"~s in 32 C. J. 1275: 
' * * * a warranty must as a rule be 
strictly true or fulfilled, while it is sufficient 
that a representation be substantially true; 
that the materiality in fact of matter made 
the subject of a warranty is not, unless the 
rule is altered by statute, important, while a 
representation, the falsity of which will 
avoid the policy, must, at least in the absence 
of bad faith, have been as to a material mat-
ter. Again, the good faith of insured is im-
material in the case of a warranty, while it is 
important in the case of a representation. 
Further, it has been pointed out that a mis-
representation renders a policy void upon 
the ground of fraud, while the falsity or non-
fulfillment of a warranty operates as a 
breach of the contract.' " 
There can be no doubt the statements were war-
ranties, and that facts relied upon by the insurer were 
falsely made, and material to the risk. Under the Brad-
dock case, supra, the policy is void irrespective of 
whether insured knew of his condition. 
Indeed, in the application in the case at hand, there 
were much more pointed questions asked than in the 
Braddock case, supra. The application required Dr. 
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Gregerson to answer if he had ever had any heart or 
circulatory diseases, or if he had ever been under ob-
servation, care or treatment in a hospital. These ques-
tions were answered in the negative by applicant, al-
though just one year prior to th~ signing of the applica-
tion for the policy sued upon, he was admitted to the 
L. D. S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, where he remained 
for fourteen days for treatment (R. 39, 40, Exhibit 6). 
While in the hospital, applicant was under the care of 
Dr. Stobbe, whose diagnosis was cardiac failure, prob-
ably coronary, hypertension and cardiac asthma (Exhibit 
?) . Digitalis constituted part of the treatment, and upon 
advice of his physician, applicant took digitalis for three 
months (Exhibit 7). A further question requiring an 
answer in the application was : "Are you now in good 
health~" In the Braddock case, supra, at page 87 of 
Volume 89 of the Utah Reports, in construing an identi-
cal provision, the Court stated : 
"As already indicated, the question for deter-
mination is not whether the applicant knew he 
was or was not in good health, or whether he an-
swered in good faith. The warranty is that he is 
in fact in good health at the time. The meaning 
of the term 'good health' is well stated in Klein 
v. Farmers' & Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 132 Kan. 
7 48, 297 p. 730, 732 : 
'What is good health as used in the insur-
ance contract like the one in question~ It 
is not apparent good health, nor yet a belief 
of the applicant that he is in good health, but 
it is that he is in actual good health. Of 
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course, slight troubles or temporary indispo-
sition which 'vill not usually result in serious 
consequences, and 'vhich do not seriously 
impair or 'veaken his constitution, do not es-
tablish the absence of good health, but, if the 
illness is of a serious nature, such as to 
'veaken and impair the constitution and 
shorten life, the applicant cannot be held to 
be in good health. l\Iiller v. ICnights and 
Ladies of Security, 103 Kan. 579, 175 P. 397; 
Pickens v. Security Benefit Ass'n., 117 Kan. 
475, 231 P. 1016, 40 A. L. R. 654. In a note 
in 40 A. L. R. 663, it is said: 'The general 
rule appears to be that the te.rm 'good health' 
when used in a policy of life insurance means 
that the applicant has no grave, important, or 
serious disease, and is free from any ailment 
that seriously affects the general soundness 
or healthfulness of the system. A mere 
temporary indisposition which does not tend 
to weaken or undermine the constitution, at 
the date of the policy, does not render the 
policy void. And it seems that an apparent 
condition of good health or anyone's belief 
that the insured is in good health is not suffi-
cient.' " 
In the light of previous opinions of this Court and 
the facts of this case, the conclusion is unescapable that 
the untrue statements and concealment of facts by appli-
cant as to his state of health rendered the certificate null 
and void. 
If the policy in question (Exhibit "A") ever became 
effective in view of the breach of warranties by applicant, 
it was by no stretch of imagination in force at the time 
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of Gregerson's death on April 8, 1950. The evidence is 
clear as to the failure to pay the premium due on J anu-
ary 1, 1950, and there was no payment tendered whatso-
ever within the grace period as required by the stipula-
tions of the insurance contract (R. 9). On February 2, 
1950, a payment covering the premium due on January 
1st was tendered, but the same was held in suspense 
by defendant, pending reinstatement, and subsequently 
returned to plaintiff (R. 9, 44, Exhibit 3). There was 
no further tender of premiums until May 3, approxi-
mately one month after the death of Dr. Gregerson, 
when the sum of $47.07 was received by defendant pur-
portedly covering the premiums due February 1st, March 
1st, and April 1st, 1950. This amount was likewise held 
in suspense pending reinstatement, and subsequently re-
turned to plaintiff (R. 10, 31, 32). 
The terms of the policy are clear as to the require-
ments for reinstatement after a lapse. The policy pro-
vides, in part, as follows : "This policy may he reinstated 
anytime within thirty days and less than six months 
after a lapse on payment to the company of arrears of 
premium with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per an-
num provided that such reinstatement shall require 
evidence of insurability satisfactory to the Company, and 
subject to reinstatement provisions (Commuted Bene-
fits) (Exhibit "A"). The trial court did not consider that 
the failure of Gregerson to pay the premiums due, and 
furnish the required proof of insurability, prevented a 
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reinstaten1ent of the policy. It "Tas not within the power 
of the court to revive the policy after lapse; that power 
alone rested with the parties to the contract. 
It is well settled that if conditions precedent to a 
reinstatement of the policy have not been performed by 
the insured, no reinstatement takes place, and his death 
during the pendency of the application gives his bene-
ficiary no right of recovery, 29 Am. Jur., page 252 ~ 268. 
Plaintiff stated that Gregerson could not sign the ap-
plication for reinstatement as he was too ill, and there 
was no attempt to comply with this requirement stipu-
lated to in the insurance contract as a condition of rein-
statement (R. 19, 20). On the contrary, the plaintiff pro-
duced a report from Dr. Stobbe stating that insured had 
been totally incapacitated for a year, as a result of a 
serious heart condition (Exhibit 2). The defendant then 
undertook an investigation to determine if insurance 
could be properly reinstated in view of insured's seri-
ously impaired health. There is no dispute that at the 
time of the lapse due to the non-payment of premiums, 
insured was practically on his death-bed. 
The general rule as to the necessity of sound health 
as a requirement for reinstating a lapsed policy of insur-
ance is stated in 29 Am. Jur., Sec. 269, at page 253, as 
follows: 
"The second condition usually required to be 
complied with in reinstating a life insurance 
policy is proof or warranty by the insured as to 
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his "good" or "sound" health or insurability at the 
time of reinstatement of the policy. Where the 
insurance contract contains such a condition, pay-
ment of the premium alone is not sufficient to 
procure a reinstatement, but the insured must 
warrant or furnish the required proof of the 
state of his health at such time; and under such 
a condition, it has been generally held that the 
appearance of good health or the reasonable be-
lief that the insured is in good health is not suffi-
cient, but that the insured must in fact be free 
from any disease or ailment which tends seri-
ously to affect his health." 
This court, in the recent case of Gressler v. New 
York Life Insurance Co., 108 Utah 182, 163 P. (2d) 
324, 164 ALR 1047, held that a policy was not entirely 
terminated upon default of premium payment, but the 
insured still had a contractual right under the policy 
to fully reinstate it upon compliance with the conditions 
for reinstatement contained in the policy. The provi-
sion in the policy construed in the Gressler case was much 
the same as the provision involved in this appeal. That 
provision also required "evidence of insurability satis-
factory to the Company" and payment of overdue pre-
miums and interest. That case differs materially, how-
ever, in that the insured, after a lapse of premiums, had 
actually returned his application for reinstatement and 
presented evidence of insurability to the c·ompany, while 
in the present case there was no evidence whatsoever of 
insurability presented by insured, nor was the applica-
tion for reinstatement ever completed by insured. Fur-
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ther in the case at bar, there was no tender of premium 
payments and interest during the lifetime of insured 
which could possibly fnlfill the requirements of the 
policy. 
Plaintiff contends, and the Court found, that by 
the 'Yaiver attached to Exhibit "A", the company waived 
physical examination of the insured as to his insurability 
at the time of application, and also at the time of any 
reinstatement (R. 45). Why, then, was the applicant 
required to complete an application for the policy before 
the same was issued~ It was not a continuation of the 
old policy (Exhibit 5), originally issued by the Mutual 
Benefit Association. The new contract became effective 
June 1, 1947, setting forth new and different duties and 
obligations between the parties. While it is basically 
the same type mutual benefit assessment certificate, it 
contained different provisions entirely foreign to the old 
type policy. 
We call the Court's attention to the waiver (Exhibit 
"A", page 2), relied upon by the plaintiff. 
The waiver, attached to the policy, reads as follows: 
"* * * WHEREAS, GRANT GREGERSON, the 
above insured, has for a period of more than six 
months immediately last past been insured under 
a policy in the Mountain States Insurance Com-
pany; and 
"WHEREAS, all of the premiums due on said 
policy for a period of six months or more im-
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mediately prior to the date hereof have been paid 
before the same became delinquent; 
"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the 
premises, it is hereby agreed that the penalties 
contained in the commuted benefits provisions of 
this policy are hereby waived as to the said 
GRANT GREGERSON to the extent of the prin-
cipal amount of the policy heretofore in force 
upon the life of the said insured, to-wit: the sum 
of $3000.00. * * *" 
The commuted benefits provisions read as follows: 
"COMMUTED BENEFITS·. (a) If the appli-
cation for this Policy is accepted and a Policy is-
sued without a satisfactory Medical Examiner's 
Report, as a condition precedent to the taking 
effect of this Policy, the Insured must be in good 
and vigorous health and free from all bodily ail-
. ments and disease at the date of issue and delivery 
of this Policy or at the date of reinstatement after 
any lapse thereof. Otherwise, any benefits ac-
cruing under this Policy are hereby forfeited and 
the Company is relieved of all liability hereunder. 
"(b) If the Insured shall die from any cause 
except accidental causes within six months follow-
ing the effective date of this Policy or following 
the date of reinstatement after any lapse thereof, 
one-half of the benefits otherwise payable here-
under will be paid." 
While there may be some ambiguity on the surface, 
a careful analysis of the terms of the insurance contract 
leaves little doubt as to the meaning of the waiver. The 
general rule of construction announced by this Court in 
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the case of Fawcett v. Security Ben. Assn., Utah, 104 
P. (2d) 21-±, was to the effect that ordinarily the con-
tract should be strictly construed against the society, 
and in favor of the insured. At page 218 of Volume 104 
P. (2d), ho,Yever, this Court stated this exception to the 
above rule: 
"Since such provision of the certificate is not 
so clear as to be susceptible of but one construc-
tion, we must determine which of the permissible 
interpretations thereof is consistent with the other 
provisions of the entire agreement. Even though 
a particular provision of a contract of insurance 
be susceptible of more than one meaning, the con-
struction of such provision more favorable to 
the assured will not be adopted if other provisions 
of the entire contract clearly resolve the am-
biguity in favor of the contrary construction." 
Looking, then, at the entire agreement (Exhibit 
"A"), how can it be said that the company waived evi-
dence of insurability at the time of issuance and any 
reinstatement of the policy~ The application, a part of 
the consideration for the issuance of the policy itself, 
reads in part as follows: 
"* * * and that this application shall be the 
basis and become part of the Contract between 
myself and the Company; and that any conceal-
ments, misrepresentations or untrue statements 
herein or if I am not alive and in good health at 
the time of the acceptance and delivery of the 
policy based hereon or at the time of any rein-
statement after a lapse thereof, hereby forfeit any 
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benefits under any Policy that may be issued and 
hereby authorize the Secretary or President to 
cancel this Policy." 
The provision as to medical reports (Exhibit "A", 
page 2), reads as follows: 
"MEDICAL REPOR·T. If a satisfactory Medical 
Examiner's report is furnished showing the In-
sured to be in good health and free from all bodily 
ailments and diseases, and this Policy is kept in 
full force and effect thereafter, without a lapse, 
the face amount of this Policy will be payable 
to the Beneficiary upon receipt of d.ue proof of 
the death of the Insured. The face amount of the 
Policy will also be payable immediately, as here-
in provided, from death caused through purely 
accidental means." 
The policy, on page 2 under Premium Payments, 
states in clear and unambiguous language : 
uif any premium is not paid within the grace peri-
od, the liability of the 0 ompany shall cease im-
mediately, except as herein expressly otherwise 
provided." 
Other general provisions which must be considered 
especially in construing the contract are the considera-
tion and reinstatement clauses, which appear on page 2 
of Exhibit A, as follows: 
"CONSIDERATION. This Policy is issued in 
consideration of the membership fee, the signed 
application therefor, copy of which is attached 
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hereto and made a part hereof and the payment 
of the premi~tnts designated in the schedule of 
Insurance on the first page hereof and as other-
'vise provided under additional premiums. This 
Policy and the application therefor shall consti-
tute the entire contract between the parties here-
to. All anszDers and statements in the application 
shall be deemed warranties and not representa-
tions. Any snch warranties if proven untrue, shall 
void this Policy and relieve the Company from all 
liability there~l,nder. This Policy is issued on a 
monthly net term basis to the first of the month 
following the date of issue, and thereafter on a 
preliminary term basis and shall be so valued. 
"REINSTATEMENT. If any premium is not 
paid as herein provided and this Policy is allowed 
to lapse, the acceptance by the Company of a past 
due premium within thirty days after lapse with-
out notice to the insured will be considered a rein-
statement as provided under "Commuted Bene-
fits." This Policy may be reinstated anytime with-
in thirty days and less than six months after a 
lapse on payment to the Company of arrears of 
premium with interest at the rate of 5% per 
annum provided that such reinstatement shall 
require evidence of insurability satisfactory to 
the Company and subject to reinstatement provi-
sions (Commuted Benefits). For each reinstate-
ment, the Cash value, the paid-up insurance and 
extended term insurance will be reduced and ex-
tended in like proportion as the amount of In-
surance liability is reduced." 
There could be no interpretation placed on the entire 
agreement that would warrant the conclusion that the 
policy waived the requirements as to physical examina-
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tions, either at the time of issuance or otherwise. If there 
had been an intent to waive these requirements, no ap .. 
plication would have been required of Gregerson as a 
condition precedent to the issuance of this policy. The 
waiver provides that Gregerson had been insured under 
another policy for more than six months immediately 
last past, and that all premiums due on said policy had 
been paid before the same became delinquent. The waiver 
was intended to apply to, and in fact waived only para-
graph (b) of Commuted Benefits, which provides that 
if insured died within six months from the date of 
policy or any reinstatement, only one-half of the bene-
fits otherwise payable would be paid. 
Because the company had previously insured Greger-
son under a different policy for in excess of six months, 
the usual penalties for reduction of benefits if insured 
died within six months were waived by the company. 
How can it be said that there was a waiver of the condi-
tions precedent to the policy taking effect, when war-
ranties set out by applicant in his application were fraud-
ulently misrepresented~ There can 'be no waiver or 
estoppel invoked against defendant when it was not 
aware of the true facts. This Court, in the case of 
Ballard v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 82 Utah 1, 21 P. (2d) 
847, at page 26 of the Utah Report, quotes with approval 
from the case of Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff, 
95 U. S. 326, 333, 24 L. Ed. 387, as to the basic principles 
of law involved herein: 
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"Not only should the company have been in-
formed of the forfeiture before it could he held 
by its action to have 'vaived it, but it should also 
have been informed of the condition of the health 
of the insured at the time the premium was ten-
dered, upon the payment of which the waiver is 
claimed. The doctrine of waiver, as asserted 
against insurance companies to avoid the strict 
enforcement of conditions contained in their poli-
cies, is only another name for the doctrine of 
estoppel. It can only be invoked where the con-
duct of the companies has been such as to induce 
action in reliance upon it, and where it would 
operate as a fraud upon the assured if they were 
afterwards allowed to disavow their conduct and 
enforce the conditions. To a just application of 
this doctrine it is essential that the company 
sought to be estopped from denying the waiver 
claimed should be apprised of all the facts: of 
those which create the forfeiture, and of those 
which wiU necessarily influence its judgment in 
consenting to waive it. The holder of the policy 
cannot be permitted to conceal from the company 
an important fact, like that of the insured being 
in extremis, and then to claim a waiver of the for-
feiture created by the act which brought the in-
sured to that condition. To permit such conceal-
ment, and yet to give to the action of the company 
the same effect as though no concealment were 
made, would tend to sanction a fraud on the part 
of the policyholder, instead of protecting him 
against the commission of one by the company." 
The only logical construction that can be placed on 
the effect of the waiver is that the company waived the 
right to forfeit one-half of the benefits otherwise payable 
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if death resulted within six months after the policy be-
came effective. Any other result or conclusion would be 
untenable. 
While the facts in the Gressler v. New York Life Ins. 
Co. case, supra, are distinguishable from the case at bar, 
this Court's statement of the rule of construction as to 
provisions for reinstatement is clearly in point. Justice 
Wolfe's language is particularly interesting in view of 
the trial court's finding that the waiver did away with 
the necessity of submitting an application for reinstate-
ment, or evidence of insurability, after a lapse of the 
policy. We quote from page 194 of the Utah Report: 
"* * * We concede that insurance policies 
should, in case of ambiguity, be construed in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer who 
drew the policy because of the known fact that 
prospects for insurance do not have the time nor 
ordinarily the ability, at least under the pressure 
of solicitation, to carefully examine and weigh the 
many printed provisions of a policy. They may 
too easily labor under the delusion that they are 
covered, only for their dependents to find that 
some exception in the policy defeats their rights 
as beneficiaries. But certainly these reasons do 
not apply with the same force to a provision for 
reinstatement where the insured is in default and 
has. ample time to ascertain his rights after de-
fault and the consequences thereof before or after 
default. We see no reason for making identical 
language or identical import of language mean 
one thing in insurance contracts and something 
different in other contracts unless the content 
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of those other contracts invests the language with 
a different meaning or intent. Insurance com-
panies should not be the orphan litigants of the 
courts." 
Earlier, this Court, in the case of Moss v. Mutual 
Benefit Health & Ace. Assn., 89 Utah 1, 56 P. (2d) 1351, 
quoted 'vith approval the language of Mr. Justice Suther-
land of the United States Supreme c·ourt as to the gene-
ral rule of construction of the terms of an insurance 
policy. .A.t page 4 of '7 olume 89 of the Utah Reports 
appears the following quotation: 
Hit is true that where the terms of a policy 
are of doubtful meaning, that construction most 
favorable to the insured will be adopted. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S·. 167, 
17 4, 44 S. Ct. 90, 68 L. Ed. 235, 31 A. L. R. 102; 
Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U. S. 
311, 322, 48 S. Ct. 512, 72 L. Ed. 895. This canon 
of construction is both reasonable and just, since 
the words of the policy are chosen by the insur-
ance company; but it furnishes no warrant for 
avoiding hard consequences by importing into a 
contract an ambiguity which otherwise would not 
exist, or, under a guise of construction, by forc-
ing from plain words unusual and unnatural 
meanings." 
In view of the interpretation that must be placed 
upon the entire contract, it is submitted that there was 
no waiver of the requirements that insured be in good 
health, either at the time of issuance or reinstatement 
of the policy. 
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Assuming, however, for the purpose of argument, 
that there had been a waiver of these physical require-
ments, could it be said that insured performed all of the 
conditions precedent to the reinstatement of the policy~ 
The defendant acted upon the purported application for 
reinstatement without delay, and when no evidence of 
insurability was forthcoming, cancelled the policy. The 
insured was in default under the terms of the policy, 
and if it was not his duty to come forward to furnish 
evidence of good health, at least he was required to pay 
the premiums due, together with interest at the rate of 
five per cent as stipulated. 
It is well settled that the first condition required to 
procure a reinstatement is the payment by the insured 
of the amount of his debts to the insurer. See 29 Am. Jur. 
253, Section 268. The policy lapsed, and no payments 
were made or tendered for the months of February, 
March or April, 1950. Nothing was done to fulfill this 
requirement during insured's lifetime. Several weeks 
after insured's death, the back premiums were tendered 
to defendant, and upon the basis of this, the trial court 
held there was a reinstatement. 
The court had no power to revive the contract, the 
conditions precedent to reinstatement were not met, and 
insured's death gave his beneficiary no right of recovery. 
Under the trial court's theory, even if insured had died 
three years or thirty years after the lapse of the policy, 
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instead of only three months, recovery could still be had 
by the beneficiary upon tender of all back premiums. 
Such a result is untenable. 
For the reasons indicated, it is submitted that the 
judgment of the trial court is contrary to the law and 
the evidence. 
Point No. 2. 
This point is directed to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
findings of fact (R. 45). For the convenience of the 
Court, the paragraphs objected to are set out as follows: 
"That Grant Gregerson was ill at the time; 
and thereafter his wife, the plaintiff, negotiated 
with the defendants even to an appearance before 
the State Insurance Commissioner ; and during 
all of said period the defendant illegally de-
.manded and continued to demand the passing of 
a physical examination by the insured as a pre-
requisite to re-instatement of the policy. By its 
own acts it led the insured to believe that any ad-
ditional tender of premiums beyond that refused 
on February 2, 1950, would likewise be refused 
without such physical examination; and there is 
no evidence that it would have accepted them. 
Grant Gregerson died on April 8, 1950; and on 
May 2, 1950, plaintiff tendered $47.07 to the de-
fendant, which was refused. Plaintiff in due time, 
after May 3, 1950, made formal proof of loss to 
the defendant and demanded payment of said 
policy, which payment was on June 13, 1950, 
definitely and finally refused. 
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"That when this policy (Exhibit A) was is-
sued on June 1, 1947, it by its terms referred to 
an old policy, which the Court finds, had been 
carried by the insured since October 23, 1940, 
with the Mountain States Insurance Company, 
for $3000, with all premiums fully paid up to June 
1, 194 7; and 'in consideration' of such old policy 
and the long-time premiums paid thereon, this 
new policy (Exhibit A) waived physical examina-
tion of the insured as to his insurability at the 
time of the issuance of the policy (June 1, 194 7) 
or any reinstatement thereof, 'to the extent of the 
principal amount of the policy heretofore in 
force', to wit, $3,000. Since the policy sued on 
(Exhibit A) is for $3,000 only, the Court finds 
that by its terms it waived physical test of in-
surability both at the time of its issuance and on 
February 2, 1950, when timely application for 
reinstatement was made." 
The chief considerations which lead appellant to dis-
agree with the above findings have been detailed in the 
argwnent under Point 1, and appellant reasserts the 
argument set forth in connection with Point 1, insofar 
as these findings are concerned. This is particularly 
true with reference to paragraph 5- relating to waiver 
of physical requirements of good health at time of is-
suance or reinstatement, and it is submitted without 
further argument that this finding is contrary to the 
evidence, and cannot be sustained. 
The Court found, in paragraph 4, that defendant 
illegally demanded a physical examination of insured 
as a prerequisite to a reinstatement of the policy, and 
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that by its own actions, defendant led the insured to 
believe that any additional tender of premiums beyond 
that refused on February 2, 1950, would likewise be re-
fused. It is submitted that there can be no estoppel or 
waiver invoked against appellant, and that the evidence 
is uncontradicted to the effect that evidence of insura-
bility satisfactory to the defendant was required before 
the policy could be reinstated. 
The first condition imposed by the reinstatement 
clause here, was that the insured present evidence of 
insurability satisfactory to the company. At page 178 
of \ 7 olume 108, Utah Reports, in the Gressler v. New Y ark 
Life Insurance Company case, supra, this Court stated: 
"* * * 'Insurability' as here used may include, 
in addition to the state of insured's health, mat-
ters affecting the insurance risk involved such as 
would have been taken into account at the time the 
policy of insurance was originally issued. See 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Pettid, 40 
Ariz. 239, 11 P. 2d 833; Kallman v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, 248 App. Div. 146, 288 N.Y. S. 
1032, affirmed 272 N. Y. 648, 5 N. E. 2d 375. As to 
the evidence which will be deemed sufficient to 
satisfy the company, the overwhelming weight of 
authority is to the effect that the company, under 
such a reinstatement clause, cannot be arbitrary 
or capricious, but that evidence which should be 
satisfactory to a reasonable insurer is all that is 
required. Kennedy v. Occidental Life Insurance 
Co., supra, and cases cited therein." 
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Under the Gressler case, supra, if insured had fully 
complied, prior to his death, with every requirement 
made by the defendant as a condition of reinstatement, 
the death of the applicant from a cause in no way in-
volved in his proof of insurability, could make no dif-
ference in the defendant's rights. In the present case, 
however, there is no evidence whatsoever that insured 
complied with any of the prerequisites for a reinstate-
ment of the policy after its lapse due to non-payment 
of premiums. It is therefore submitted that the above 
findings are contrary to the evidence, and that the policy 
was not in force at the time of insured's death. 
Point No. 3. 
This point is directed to paragraph 6 of the findings 
of fact (R. 46), wherein the Court found that the physi-
cal condition and prior hospitalization of insured at the 
time of issuance of the policy was immaterial. For the 
convenience of the Court, this finding is set out as fol-
lows: 
"The Court further finds that the application 
set forth by defendant's answer in paragraph 4 
is part of Exhibit A, the policy itself; that the 
insured had been hospitalized at the L. D. S. 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, from April 27, 
1946, to May 11, 1946, with medical reports there-
on as detailed in an Exhibit duly admitted, and 
later in the Veterans Hospital; but the Court 
finds that such had no application to this policy, 
which waived all test of insurability up to the 
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amount of the old policy, $3,000, furthermore the 
policy, by its terms, becruue incontestable after 
two years." 
Appellant, under Point 1, supra, fully discussed 
its contention that the breach of 'varranty on behalf of 
insured voided the contract and relieved defendant of 
all liability thereunder. The evidence is uncontradicted 
that Dr. Gregerson, at the time of his application, was in 
ill health, and that his ailments seriously enhanced risk 
of death, and were material to the risk at the time of 
the application. 
It is submitted that the Court erred in finding that 
the hospitalization and condition of health of the insured 
was immaterial at the time of application for the policy 
sued upon, and that the case of Braddock, by Smith, 
v. Pacific Woodmen Life Assn., supra, is controlling 
and decisive of this case insofar as the warranties are 
concerned. 
The Court further found that the policy by its terms 
. waived all test of insurability at the time of its issuance. 
This point has also been fully discussed by appellant 
under Point 1, supra. We submit that there is no logical 
basis upon which the entire agreement could be inter-
preted to result in a waiver of the requirement of good 
health at the time of issuance, which was a part of the 
consideration for the issuance of the policy itself. The 
waiver itself referred only to the usual penalties for 
reduction of benefits if the insured died within six 
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months after the issuance or reinstatement of the policy. 
If the Court's interpretation is followed, recovery could 
be had of only one-half of the amount of the policy, under 
any circumstances, as the waiver could not be construed 
to apply to both sections (a) and (b) of paragraph 
relating to commuted benefits (Exhibit A, page 2). 
It is submitted that said finding was in error, and 
contrary to the evidence. 
Point No. 4. 
Appellant's last point is directed to that portion of 
paragraph 6 of the findings of fact, which found that 
the policy, by its terms, became incontestable after two 
years. The provision relating to incontestability is set 
out below for the convenience of the Court: 
"INCONTESTABILITY. This policy shall 
be incontestable after it has been in continuous 
force and effect, during the lifetime of the In-
sured, for a period of two years from the first 
of the month following the date of issue or any 
reinstatement thereof, except for non-payment 
of premiums, fraud, misstatement of facts or 
age." 
It will be noted that the provisions of the above 
section expressly except incontestability for the non-
payment of premiums, fraud, misstatement of facts or 
age. The law is too well established to cite cases as to the 
interpretation of such a clause. It is submitted that the 
finding is clearly contrary to the evidence, in view of the 
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admitted non-payment of premiums and the uncontra-
dicted evidence of fraudulent concealment of facts by 
insured. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court was in error, and that the judgment should 
be reversed and an appropriate order entered dismissing 
the action, and that appellant should be awarded its costs 
on this appeal 
Respectfully su~mitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN and WORSLEY, 
and VERL c .. RITCHIE, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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